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Consent and Political Legitimacy 
 
Abstract 
Consent plays a leading role in many theories of political legitimacy. Two approaches to 
theorizing about why consent matters for legitimacy have been dominant: the hypothetical 
consent approach, which argues that a regime is legitimate insofar as all of its subjects would 
agree to it under idealized conditions, and the express consent approach, which argues that a 
regime is legitimate for each subject insofar as that subject has expressly consented to it. In this 
paper, I argue that both views involve unacceptable idealizations. Instead, I develop and defend a 
new conception of political legitimacy based on actual consent. According to this view, a state is 
legitimate insofar as it achieves actual quality consent to rule. Quality consent obtains when a 
subject consents to her state on the basis of a judgment of governance success, provided that the 
judgment does not conflict with the government’s minimal aim, i.e. basic security for all 
subjects. The view that I develop, therefore, values consent to rule in a novel way, permitting it 
to count in favor of legitimacy even when it is not unanimous. Accordingly, a state comes to be 




Political legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed.1 Many theories of legitimacy 
accept this basic principle in some form, but they differ on how consent is to be understood. 
Today, those who believe that consent matters for legitimacy typically articulate its significance 
via theoretical idealizations. Those idealizations have costs. I will argue that we need not incur 
those costs, and indeed we ought not incur them, in a consent-based theory of legitimacy. 
Ultimately, I will defend an alternative view that avoids those costs and has considerable 
                                                            
1 For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Samuel Asarnow, Mark Budolfson, Lee-Ann Chae, 
Alan Code, Joshua Cohen, Brian Coyne, Bryan Cwik, Jorah Dannenberg, David Estlund, Blake Francis, David Hills, 
John Horton, Jeff Howard, Abby Everett Jacques, Dhananjay Jagannathan, Richard Kraut, Cristina LaFont, RJ 
Leland, Nethanel Lipshitz, Benjamin Miller, Katherine Meadows, Jane Mansbridge, Martha Nussbaum, Josiah Ober, 
Debra Satz, Kevin Vallier, Han van Wietmarschen, Allen Wood, and anonymous referees. I am also grateful for 
comments from audiences at Stanford University, University of Chicago, Northwestern University, and the 2014 
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Workshop. I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Stanford 
Humanities Center, the Institute for Humane Studies, and the University of Chicago Law School. 
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advantages. While I cannot defend a comprehensive account of political legitimacy here, I hope 
to say enough to motivate an approach to legitimacy that is, I believe, superior to the dominant 
approaches in political philosophy.  
The views I criticize fall into two camps. Those in the contractualist family believe 
legitimacy rests on hypothetical consent, where this consent is imputed based on certain 
presumptions about the agent's evaluative stance. However, these presumptions fail to adequately 
respect the subject's interest in voluntary rule, since legitimacy does not depend on whether 
subjects actually consent. On the other hand, those in the voluntarist family believe legitimacy 
rests on actual consent, but an individual's consent renders the government legitimate only for 
that individual. However, since the unanimous consent of all subjects is unattainable, these views 
must idealize about the degree of unanimity required to achieve legitimacy overall, or else accept 
that no past or present regimes are legitimate. The shortcomings of both views seem to create an 
impasse. Neither side can see an alternative consent-based theory that avoids these costs. I will 
argue for a new view that does so, while retaining much that is of value in the other views. A 
discussion of these shortcomings will occupy the first portion of the paper. In the second part of 
the paper, I present the new view and show why it has significant advantages as a theory of 
political legitimacy. 
In order to explain the shortcomings of current consent views of legitimacy, I want to 
begin with some general thoughts about how the question of legitimacy is to be theorized. One 
basic question concerns the objects of our assessments of legitimacy. I take the paradigmatic 
object of legitimacy assessments to be political orders broadly construed, which I will call 
regimes.2 For purposes of this paper, I take legitimacy assessments to be addressing the question 
                                                            
2 Assessments of regimes may include abstract institutional features (e.g. constitutional essentials) as well as 
concrete instantiations of those features (e.g. how the ruling party or government is currently exercising power via 
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of when a regime has appropriate standing to exercise power over its subjects.3 It is also possible 
to assess the legitimacy of ruling parties, policies, laws, and even particular actions, but I will be 
concerned in this paper with the overall political or constitutional order.  
Second, I observe that many theorists subscribe to a strict distinction between normative 
and descriptive legitimacy.4 I think this dichotomy is too strong. Theorists ought to give more 
consideration to how the term is used in non-philosophical discourse, where it is more or less 
used in the sociological sense first identified by Max Weber.5 In these discourses, broadly 
speaking, legitimacy is a social fact about whether the subjects of a regime believe it has 
authority. In my view, it is worthwhile to explore what normative significance this sociological 
concept may have. Relatedly, I observe that theorists who are focused on a theory of normative 
legitimacy often build in liberal and democratic presumptions. For example, one family of views 
claims that a regime is illegitimate unless it treats all subjects as free and equal.6 While such a 
demanding stance might license us to call illiberal or undemocratic regimes illegitimate, it also 
runs together several distinct registers of political evaluation. In what follows, I aim to show how 
it is possible and fruitful to keep the assessment of legitimacy distinct from other modes of 
political evaluation, such as democracy and liberalism.  
Finally, I observe that some theorists advance views of legitimacy that are quite 
demanding. If the theories were applied as stated, the result would be that no regime in the past 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
those institutional features). 
3 Because part of my aim is to propose a new account of the relationship between consent and legitimacy, leading 
off the inquiry with a more explicit definition would be either question-begging or self-defeating. For example, 
“right to rule” approaches tend to result in accounts of justified coercion (which often cast consent in a contractualist 
role) or justified authority (which often sideline consent altogether). 
4 (Buchanan and Keohane 2006), (Copp 1999), (Rawls 2001). 
5 For a succinct discussion of the contemporary practice of making legitimacy assessments, see Chapter 5 of 
(Buchanan 2013). For Weber's original discussion, see (Weber 1978). 
6 Examples abound, but the seminal statement is Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy: “Our exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their 
common human reason” (Rawls, 1996, 137}. 
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or in the present would meet the standards of legitimacy. This approach to theorizing legitimacy 
has limited usefulness, in my view, and it also invites a kind of resignation on the part of political 
actors. Ultimately, I will argue that the alternative conception of legitimacy defended in the 
paper does better than other consent-based theories at fulfilling three separate desiderata: 
articulating a useful conception of legitimacy, showing how it is distinct from other modes of 
political evaluation, and explaining why it is valuable. 
 
2. Shortcomings of Other Consent Theories 
The two families of consent based theories of legitimacy that I will discuss may be 
formulated as follows: 
Voluntarism: A regime is legitimate for each subject insofar as that subject has actually consented to it. 
Contractualism: A regime is legitimate insofar as every subject would consent under idealized conditions. 
 
 
To motivate the development of an alternative, I will outline some shortcomings in these 
versions of consent theory. First I will address contractualism, to which I devote more space 
because it is by far the predominant philosophical approach to legitimacy.  
Contractualism employs the idea of a hypothetical contract or unforced agreement among 
free and equal persons.7 The contractualist claims, very roughly, that a regime gains legitimacy 
by organizing institutions around principles of justification that all citizens would freely accept 
under certain conditions. The construction of the hypothetical choice situation employs a variety 
of idealizing assumptions, typically including citizens' willingness to cooperate on fair terms, the 
reasonableness of citizens' value judgments, the common interest in membership in a group on 
                                                            
7 While accounts of political community are more often called contractarian (based on claims of mutual advantage), 
I deliberately employ the term contractualist in order to consider just those theories that are based on the "equal 
moral status of persons," drawing on their "capacity for rational autonomous agency."  See (Ashford and Mulgan 
2012). 
A. R. Greene 
Penultimate version – please cite version published in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (2016) 5 
terms of equal standing, etc. In order to isolate the consent element of the view, I will focus on 
the formal feature of hypothetical acceptability.8 The relevant aspect of the contractualist 
position, then, is the idea that regimes are legitimate (at least in part) because their justification is 
hypothetically acceptable to all citizens.9 I will now discuss two shortcomings of contractualism 
as a theory of legitimacy: the problem of involuntary rule, which arises at both the collective and 
individual level, and the challenge of partisan evaluation. 
 
2.1. The Costs of Contractualism: Collective Involuntary Rule 
First, contractualism faces a difficulty in explaining some basic intuitions we have about 
voluntary and involuntary rule. Consider the tendency we have to associate popular acceptance 
with legitimacy or to associate popular rejection with a lack of legitimacy. We seem to think 
there is something problematic or amiss when the subjects en masse disavow the regime that 
claims authority over them. We might even say that the subjects, at a collective level, are 
involuntarily subjected to rule in some sense. To make this point vivid, consider the following 
illustration: imagine there are two political communities that have a similar constitution and 
government, but in one case 80% of the subjects affirm the regime, and in the other case, 30% 
affirm the regime. (Assume that both regimes are justified by publicly acceptable reasons.) It 
seems natural and intuitive to say that a regime garnering the support of 30% of its subjects is 
less legitimate than one garnering 80% support. How might this intuition be explained?  
                                                            
8 Contractualists may reply that justification is not conferred by consent per se, but rather that idealized agreement is 
used to model moral reasoning - and especially to identify the morally relevant features of a relationship. So 
understood, contractualism ought not be taken as a consent-based theory. But if the model at all relies for its validity 
on the idea of unforced agreement (and, consequently, its value in realizing a certain kind of respect), then it draws 
on some ideal of voluntary acceptance of rule. Contractualists might deny that the notion of hypothetical 
acceptability exhausts their defense of legitimacy, but I think they must admit that it comprises their account of the 
role consent plays in legitimacy. 
9 Of the theorists who think hypothetical acceptability is necessary for legitimacy, some also think it is sufficient, or 
that it is sufficient in combination with other factors related to hypothetical acceptability.  See (Cohen 1996) and 
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Perhaps one explanation is that the 80% support is evidence that some of the 
government's policies have superior welfare outcomes (either aggregatively or distributively). 
But now, stipulate that both have the same welfare outcomes: if one regime garners 80% support 
while the other only 30%, it seems there is still something problematic or amiss about the regime 
that lacks popular support. One might also argue in this vein that 80% support is evidence of the 
epistemic superiority of the governance – that is, those in power know more and thus govern 
better (even if, by luck, the outcomes are on a par). Then, one might argue, the difference in 
degree of popular support accurately reflects the difference in likelihood that the regime is 
governed knowledgeably. Does the intuition remain? In response I would make a similar 
stipulation: suppose that the governments of the two countries exhibit identical epistemic virtues 
and are equally likely to govern knowledgeably, but one garners 80% support while the other 
garners 30%. Does the intuition remain? Consider again the non-supporting portions of the 
population: in the 30% case, a large majority of the population (70%) is involuntarily subject to a 
government they do not support — though it may be due to their lacking the cognitive or 
epistemic capacities to see that it is worthy of their support. In the 80% case, this subjection is 
true of only a small minority of the population (20%).  
One might still argue that intuitions about the 30/80 illustration reflect our concerns about 
the stability of the polity. Though somewhat plausible, a reference to stability still does not fully 
explain the intuition, since stipulating a parity of stability-related consequences nonetheless 
leaves us with a residual discomfort. When a group of subjects does not accept their regime, this 
situation is to be regretted and avoided if possible, and at the very least it ought to be minimized. 
In general, most of us have an aversion to having a government or regime deliberately forced 
upon us, and we infer that others are similarly averse to this treatment. The 30/80 illustration 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Estlund 2007). 
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alerts us to a concern about involuntary subjection to a political order, no matter the merits of 
that order.  
Theorists of legitimacy, including contractualists, must either deny that the problem of 
collective involuntary rule has intuitive force, deny that its force has relevance for legitimacy, or 
account for it in some way. In my view, the problem ought not to be denied, because it raises a 
moral concern about involuntary subjection to a political order, even if the order is worthy of 
support. Nevertheless, a contractualist may accept the intuition that something has gone wrong, 
but still question its relevance for legitimacy. But this denial is strained. If legitimacy is 
understood, in the broadest terms, as appropriate rule, then widespread popular rejection of such 
rule seems directly relevant. Contractualism, however, is ill-equipped for accommodating the 
way in which actual popular acceptance and rejection matter, because it locates all the facts 
relevant for legitimacy within the hypothetical choice situation.  
According to the contractualist, legitimacy arises from the unanimous consent of parties 
who are idealized in certain kinds of ways: if a person's deliberation were to meet certain 
stipulated conditions, then she would consent to a political order with certain features. Thus the 
stipulations contained in the hypothetical choice situation are paramount in determining when 
and how consent bears on legitimacy. The stipulations mediate, structure, and constrain the way 
consent can alter legitimacy assessments.  
The difficulty with forcing consent's significance to be mediated by hypothetical 
idealizations is that we begin to attenuate the moral force of consent, or rather, the moral force of 
non-consent. In The Social Contract, Rousseau insists that once the people are acknowledged as 
being sovereign, their scope of authority cannot be limited, not even by the hypothetical contract 
itself. Popular sovereignty requires periodic referenda by the people on the form of government, 
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in which is it possible to change the regime entirely. He says, “In the state there is no 
fundamental law that cannot be revoked, not even the social compact. For if all the citizens were 
to assemble in order to break this compact by common agreement, no one could doubt that it was 
legitimately broken” (Rousseau 1987, III.xviii). According to Rousseau, any regime relying on 
agreement for its legitimacy is thereby liable to lose its legitimacy if the agreement is revoked. 
Essentially, the people's actual exercise of free choice cannot be constrained by its hypothetical 
exercise of free choice.  
While Rousseau did not fully spell out the implications of these claims about revoking 
the social compact, his analysis underscores a tension in the hypothetical consent approach to 
legitimacy. Within the framework of contractualism, we lack a principled way to integrate the 
hypothetical consent of the governed and the actual consent of the governed, though they both 
seem to matter for legitimacy. If the contractualist approach does not accommodate a direct 
sensitivity to actual consent to rule on the part of the subjects, then it is hard to see how it can 
address the concern about involuntary rule at the collective level. 
 
2.2. The Costs of Contractualism: Individual Involuntary Rule 
Contractualist theories of legitimacy face another problem related to the idea of voluntary 
rule — this time, the problem is visible at the level of the individual. Consider the following 
stylized dialogue between the spokesman for a regime (say, a government official) and a subject. 
If the official justified an exercise of authority by claiming that the subjects willed it in a 
hypothetical sense, then if a subject wished to object, his objection would have the following 
form: “No, I did not will it in a hypothetical sense, and here is why.” With the dispute having 
been framed in such a way, the official and the subject would begin arguing about whether the 
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exercise of authority meets certain conditions, namely those conditions that would settle whether 
he willed it in a hypothetical sense. If the official's reasoning prevails, then she will have 
simultaneously settled both whether the justification is valid (i.e. whether the specified 
conditions were met) and whether it possesses the relevant sort of recognition by subjects.  
For a contractualist, it does not matter for legitimacy whether an individual does 
recognize (or consent to) rule, as long as he would recognize (or consent to) rule. In other words, 
the withholding of recognition of a regime cannot bear directly on legitimacy, because the 
normative space required in order for the individual's withholding to matter for legitimacy (i.e. to 
alter legitimacy assessments) is eliminated whenever the regime's own claim to be contractually 
justified is true. While some may see this feature of contractualism as its strength, there is 
nevertheless something morally troubling when an individual is treated as though her actual non-
consent does not matter for legitimacy, as long as her hypothetical consent has been obtained 
(i.e. established through philosophical argument). There are multiple domains in which such 
treatment would be obviously troubling. For example, according to ‘informed consent' 
requirements in medicine, actual non-consent settles the matter even when there are very good 
justifications for consent. This sort of moral unease gives us good reason to separate the validity 
of a regime's claims from the recognition of a regime's claims, such that we can identify 
situations in which one has been achieved without the other.  
Preserving the independent significance of recognition requires that when a subject fails 
to recognize something even when it is fully warranted, this recognitional failure matters. When 
the lack of recognition matters independently of whether it is warranted, then when recognition 
is correct and freely given, it adds something beyond hypothetical recognition: it pays due 
respect to the individual's standing as recognizer. A contractualist defense of political legitimacy 
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inadequately respects individuals' standing as independent recognizers of claims that are made in 
the justification of rule. A devoted contractualist may still ask: why is this a problem? It's a 
problem because it doesn't sufficiently respect an individual's capacity to evaluate rule in their 
non-idealized state. The contractualist might respond that it respects their evaluative capacities in 
a different, more generic way. The further reply is that while this generic kind of respect has 
value, legitimacy should be about actual attitudes, because the attainment of voluntary rule 
should be sensitive to particularity at the individual level.  
In a related line of criticism, A. John Simmons argues that contractualism collapses the 
distinction between justification to a hypothetical citizen and justification to a particular citizen. 
He points out that legitimacy depends on historical facts about the relationship between an 
individual and an institution, a dimension that is missed on the Kantian approach:  
The proper grounds for claims of legitimacy concern the transactional components of the specific 
relationship between individual and institution... No specific actual history of morally significant relations 
between a particular state and each of its subjects is thought by Kant to be necessary to support the 
transition from justifying the state to legitimating a particular state with respect to all of its subjects... 
Therefore, Kantians have appropriated the justificatory force of voluntarism without having any respect for 
people's actual choices. (Simmons 1999, 755–756)10 
 
Here Simmons emphasizes the way in which the historical facts about a state's relationship with 
an individual are relevant to its legitimacy.11 The notion of ‘standing-to-recognize,' reflects our 
appropriate concern with the particularity of the relationship between regimes and individual 
subjects. 
 
2.3. The Costs of Contractualism: Partisan Legitimacy 
                                                            
10 As a matter of technical clarification, Simmons' terminology differs from mine.  He says justification pertains to 
whether a state has a right to exist, while legitimacy pertains to the “complex moral right [a particular state] 
possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, 
and to use coercion to enforce these duties.” Simmons also equates legitimacy with the individual obligation to 
obey, a “logical correlate” I do not accept (Simmons 1999, 746). 
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I have argued that contractualism incurs theoretical costs in its inability to register the 
withholding of voluntary acceptance of rule, both at the collective and the individual level. I 
emphasized that this inability is a failure to give due respect to the actual judgments of 
individuals and communities in their real circumstances (as opposed to idealized circumstances), 
and I suggested that this failure weakens the claim that legitimacy corresponds to the attainment 
of voluntary rule. Now I want to propose that the contractualist's need to idealize consent has a 
further problematic dimension. The contractualist prejudges which categories of political facts 
are relevant for consent, thereby making legitimacy unnecessarily partisan. Some evidence of 
this partisan mode is the tendency for contractualist formulations of legitimacy to involve liberal 
and democratic presuppositions as a matter of definition. These presuppositions in turn make it 
impossible for non-democratic and non-liberal forms of government to achieve legitimacy. Note 
that the putative illegitimacy of these regimes does not follow from any separate considerations 
but rather from the role of consent in establishing legitimacy. This is a theoretical entanglement 
we would do well to avoid. 
The contractualist approach I have described consists of two distinct claims: we each 
deserve acceptable justification for claims of authority being made on us, and the provision of 
such justification is necessary and sufficient for establishing legitimacy (understood as the 
consent of the governed). The contractualist must commit to some conditions being necessary 
and sufficient for imputing universal agreement, howsoever the hypothetical choice is 
constructed. Thus, contractualism determines ex ante, and on behalf of everyone, which moral 
considerations do and do not matter for legitimacy, and how they are to be assessed. By 
determining in advance which moral considerations do and don't matter for establishing 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
11 For a fuller discussion of the way in which our conception of legitimacy ought to accommodate the fact that it is 
evaluated differently in different historical circumstances, see (Horton 2012). 
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hypothetical consent, contractualist views draw a line around the acceptable grounds for the 
consent of the governed in terms of a particular characterization of the moral justification of 
government. Contractualism must, therefore, rely on a ‘partisan' view of how consent fixes the 
facts about legitimacy.  
In many cases, the moral considerations that are adverted to by contractualists concern 
whether subjects are treated as free and equal, in some sense, by their government. This common 
formulation embeds liberal and democratic requirements into the ideal of voluntary rule, the very 
ideal underlying consent-based theories of legitimacy — indeed, the securing of unanimous 
consent is itself an expression of free and equal treatment. Contractualists may object that what I 
identify as a theoretical cost of their approach is precisely the feature they consider to be its 
theoretical strength. But I think they have not taken a wide enough view about the costs that are 
incurred. Advocating such a partisan view prevents us from having a theory of legitimacy that 
applies, without significant idealization, to the situations in which we find ourselves today. For 
instance, it seems plausible that there could be regimes that are legitimate but not democratic; 
conversely, there could be regimes that are democratic but not legitimate. It would be useful to 
have a conception of legitimacy that can help us understand why things like liberal rights, 
equality, and democracy contribute to the attainment of legitimacy (if they do), without building 
those political ideals into our very concept of legitimacy. In what follows, I present an alternative 
conception of political legitimacy that can be usefully applied to non-liberal and non-democratic 
states, thereby avoiding a partisan articulation of the role of consent in establishing legitimacy. 
 
2.4. The Costs of Voluntarism 
I turn now to a discussion of the shortcomings of voluntarism. According to the 
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voluntarist variant of consent theory, a regime is legitimate insofar as each subject actually 
consents to it. This consent then is binding in two ways: the state is bound to exercise authority 
within the limits of the expressed consent, and the individual is bound to obey the authority to 
which he has consented. A recent advocate of the view, A. John Simmons, argues that the 
legitimacy of the state arises only from the consent of the individual (Simmons 1999). On this 
view, the actual consent of the individual is necessary and (usually) sufficient for the state to 
possess legitimacy with respect to that citizen.12 The picture often relies on a notion of natural 
rights as pre-political moral entitlements, such that each person has a right to defend their 
entitlements against encroachments by others. The state's authority arises from the deliberate 
transfer of this right to a single authority, who makes determinations and exercises coercion in 
order to enforce each individual's rights. This view construes legitimacy as a property of the 
relationship between the state and an individual, meaning that the state can be legitimate with 
respect to one citizen and illegitimate with respect to another. I designate this view a form of 
voluntarism because it so closely tailors legitimacy assessments to facts about the will of the 
individual. 
There are several problems with this view, but a major concern is that the required 
consent standard cannot be met in a way that issues in legitimacy. One sense in which it cannot 
be met is that it is impossible to get the consent of every single individual subject. If unanimity is 
impossible, one might be forced to conclude that legitimacy is virtually unattainable. Indeed, 
Simmons bites the bullet and concludes that “no existing states are legitimate.”13 This problem 
arises because voluntarism is sensitive to the moral significance of consent, but it is sensitive in 
                                                            
12 Simmons adds a proviso to whether consent is sufficient (derived from Locke):  “We cannot bind ourselves by 
consent to immoral arrangements” (Simmons 1999, 746). I return to this proviso later. 
13 He says, “Because I subscribe to political voluntarism as the correct account of these transactional grounds for 
legitimacy, and because I believe no actual states satisfy the requirements of this voluntarism, I also believe that no 
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such a way as to make unanimous consent necessary for legitimacy. Alternatively, one might say 
that unanimous consent is not necessary for legitimacy overall, but only necessary for legitimacy 
construed as a feature distributed across individuals. The problem would then be that legitimacy 
is piecemeal, not a feature of a regime overall. When we ask whether a regime is legitimate, we 
are concerned with its general standing with respect to the subjects of the regime. It is not clear 
how piecemeal legitimacy could address the question of general standing without abstracting 
away, through idealization, from some subjects' non-consent, thereby treating them differently 
than the consenting subjects.  
And finally, the voluntarist implicitly relies on an implausible connection between 
consent and an ideal of self-rule.14 The voluntarist seeks to derive legitimacy by construing 
consent as a kind of delegation of authority that preserves an ideal of self-rule. The individual 
avoids a pernicious subjection to the rule of others because their obligation to obey arises only by 
their own consent. In positing such a direct connection between consent and the avoidance of 
involuntary subjection, the voluntarist implicitly presumes that consent evinces some status 
approximating self-rule. But it is very difficult to see how granting consent to one's regime ought 
to count as self-rule without idealizing to a significant degree.15 Even in societies whose 
government is highly participatory, construing a subject's consent as evincing self-rule requires 
making highly controversial assumptions about collective will formation. The voluntarist 
strategy of deriving legitimacy from the willing transfer by individuals of those rights and 
privileges associated with self-rule is not a realistic model for today's political orders. Therefore 
the voluntarist must either stretch the definition of consent so far that it is imputed on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
existing states are legitimate.”  However, Simmons goes on to argue that he thinks states that are neither justified nor 
legitimate can nevertheless act in ways that are justified (e.g. to prevent violent crime)  (Simmons 1999, 269–770). 
14 This problem is most evident in libertarian approaches to legitimacy based on the idea of self-ownership. For the 
seminal statement, see (Nozick 1974).  For a more contemporary version, see (Huemer 2012). 
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factors whose connection to self-rule is highly attenuated and idealized, or he must admit that the 
required consent standard cannot be met in a way that is sufficient for legitimacy. 
 
3. An Alternative Conception of Legitimacy 
In the remaining discussion, I defend an alternative view of legitimacy, arguing that it is 
superior to other consent based views of legitimacy. A basic statement of the view, which I call 
the sovereignty conception, is that a regime is legitimate insofar as it achieves actual quality 
consent to rule based on positive governance assessments. The view retains a key insight of 
voluntarism: actual consent matters. But, since unanimous consent is impossible, the sovereignty 
conception focuses on achieving actual consent among a high proportion of subjects. At the same 
time, the sovereignty view retains a key insight of contractualism: not all actual consent matters. 
The sovereignty conception employs the notion of quality consent because consent's significance 
is dependent on meeting certain minimal conditions -- namely, being based on an individual's 
positive governance assessment. The sovereignty conception, therefore, stakes out an innovative 
position in theorizing about how consent relates to legitimacy: a regime is legitimate insofar as it 
achieves consent that is (a) actual rather than idealized, (b) proportional rather than unanimous, 
and (c) based on positive governance assessments. In order to show how this view is superior to 
other views, I first need to explain these interrelated aspects of the sovereignty view. The next 
three sections lay out the key elements of the view. 
 
3.1. Voluntary Rule 
I will introduce the sovereignty conception by returning to the original ideal underlying 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
15 For a recent exposition of this problem from the perspective of the neorepublican tradition, see Chapter 3 of (Pettit 
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consent theories of legitimacy: the ideal of voluntary rule.16 It is plausible to think that each 
individual, considered in his role as the subject of a political order, has an interest in being ruled 
voluntarily. One is ruled voluntarily when one is willing to remain a subject of one's particular 
political order, all things considered. One may characterize a willing subject as one who freely 
consents to the particular system of rule to which one is subject. An unwilling subject is one who 
disavows being ruled to such a degree that one is willing to engage in disruptive and costly 
resistance (if it stands a chance of being effective) in order to fundamentally change the 
constitutional order, including the basic power-conferring norms of that order.17 It also seems 
plausible to think that this interest in voluntary rule is significant and universal, meaning that it is 
important for everyone, though it need not override all other interests at stake in politics. 
However, being a willing subject of a regime is not unconditionally good. Not every 
voluntary act of an individual has import simply because it is freely chosen — conditions must 
be met. Accordingly, consent-to-rule is only valuable when it meets certain conditions. I will say 
more about these conditions shortly, but what is important to note here is that consent's role in 
realizing the interest in voluntary rule is going to be conditional. This conditionality illustrates 
consent's nature as a dependent good, a good whose value depends on other things. I will call 
instances of consent that meet the relevant conditions ‘quality consent.'18  
Although the significance of consent is conditional, its value is nevertheless non-
instrumental. How should we understand this kind of good, something that has dependent non-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2012). 
16 Since I think voluntary rule is something that all consent theorists would accept at some level of generality, I take 
myself to be elaborating a particular interpretation of voluntary rule. 
17 I cannot give a full definition here, but determining whether any given person is a willing subject will need to 
include reference to both attitudes and behavioral dispositions. The paradigmatic case of an unwilling subject is the 
revolutionary. 
18 I acknowledge that some readers may be inclined to focus on validity when thinking about consent, but I focus on 
its value, i.e. why we should care whether there is consent, since this account will need to underlie any account of its 
validity. 
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instrumental value? Joseph Raz elucidates the structure of a dependent, non-instrumental good 
when he discusses the concept of autonomy:  
There is no contradiction in claiming both that autonomy is intrinsically valuable and that the fact that 
people's lives are autonomous contributes to their well-being only to the extent that they engage in 
worthwhile pursuits. What is intrinsically valuable can be, and in the case of autonomy is, valuable as a 
constituent of a good in itself. Remove other elements of the good in itself and it may turn worthless, or 
even bad. (Raz 1988, 1228–9)  
 
For Raz, autonomous choice has intrinsic but dependent value: when what is chosen is valuable 
(e.g. a musical project), the fact that it is autonomously chosen contributes intrinsically to its 
value in an organic way.19 But if the object of choice is not valuable (e.g. an assassination 
project), then something that would otherwise be of value has no value.20 In sum, the value of 
autonomy cannot be made instrumental to the value of what is chosen, though its value depends 
on what is chosen. In my view, consent-to-be-ruled is analogous to Raz's claim about autonomy 
in that its value may be nullified if certain conditions are not met, but when present it has a non-
instrumental value that cannot be reduced to the conditions on which its value depends. 
 
3.2. Quality Consent 
The sovereignty conception claims that a regime is legitimate insofar as it achieves stable 
and widespread actual quality consent to rule among subjects. I construe quality consent as 
consent based on positive governance assessments. At a minimum, a positive governance 
assessment is the judgment by a particular subject of some sort of governance success. The most 
basic claim of government is to benefit its subjects through the exercise of power, so the relevant 
                                                            
19 I wish to avoid claims of intrinsic value, so I claim that it has “non-instrumental” value.  For an extensive 
discussion of dependent non-instrumental value, see (Sandbu 2007). 
20 It is important not to confuse Raz's point with one that sounds similar, articulated by Amartya Sen among others, 
about the role of agency in making something valuable.  (Sen 1997) distinguishes between comprehensive outcomes 
and culmination outcomes, where the former are valued for some aspect of how they are achieved, e.g. involving 
agency. Raz is concerned with how the value of autonomous choice depends on the value of what is chosen, while 
Sen's concern is with how the value of what is chosen depends on whether agency is involved. 
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recognition of success is a subject's judgment regarding whether benefits have arisen from the 
exercise of power. I call these sorts of judgments governance assessments, and they are in terms 
of subjective welfare, i.e. perceived welfare at either the individual or collective level. On the 
basis of what a subject considers relevant and valuable by her own lights, she forms an overall 
subjective assessment of governance and, on that basis, consents to her political order. The view 
is deliberately permissive about what counts as a positive governance assessment.  
Therefore, on the sovereignty conception, a regime comes to be legitimate by delivering 
benefits through the exercise of power in such a way as to be widely recognized as doing so by 
its subjects. In this scenario, the rulers seek and promote the common good as they see it, and the 
subjects voluntarily accept their subjection because they think the rulers are advancing the 
common good, as each subject sees it. This expansive notion of a positive governance 
assessment allows for a wide range of judgments to count as quality consent. The actual benefits 
delivered may outstrip or fall short of the perceived benefits, the perceived benefits, may be non-
overlapping, and there may be variable sophistication in terms of the understanding and how and 
why these benefits were achieved.21 The notion of a positive governance assessment allows for 
entirely idiosyncratic judgments about the goods government ought to serve, letting a “thousand 
flowers bloom.” 
 
3.3. Non-Quality Consent 
However, not all governance assessments meet the conditions for quality consent. How is 
non-quality consent to be distinguished? I will approach this question through an examination of 
paradigmatic cases of non-quality consent. First, consent-to-rule which is brought about by 
                                                            
21 While I cannot give a full account here of the judgment underlying quality consent, what is essential is that it 
involves a (perhaps implicit) belief that the political order is subjectively valuable. 
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certain kinds of fear and intimidation does not count: it does not qualify as consent-to-rule as I 
have articulated it, which is the voluntary acceptance of a system of rule.22 There are three 
further cases of consenting subjects whose consent, at least intuitively, should not count in favor 
of legitimacy: the dominator, the underling, and the culpably ignorant. Any adequate definition 
of quality consent ought to exclude these cases: 
a) The dominator is someone who consents to rule on the basis of a judgment that it is 
acceptable to deprive others of basic security. 
b) The underling is someone who consents to rule on the basis of a judgment that it is 
acceptable for himself to be deprived of basic security.  
c) The culpably ignorant is someone whose consent to rule is strongly insensitive to facts 
about whether some subjects are being deprived of basic security. 
It seems intuitive that these three cases should not bear positively on assessments of legitimacy. 
Note that they are all partly characterized in terms of basic security, i.e. minimal order and 
protection from violence. 
Why set the bar so low? A variation on the view that may be more attractive to some 
readers is to set the bar higher, such as protection of human rights, or provision of basic 
capabilities. This variation would still have the structure of an actual quality consent view. But in 
proposing the sovereignty conception, I aim to construct an account of legitimacy that is more 
agnostic about the relationship of legitimacy to other political values, such that it has a wider 
application than only to liberal democracies. If we were to examine instances of political orders 
in various historical periods — honor-based tribal communities, medieval feudal systems, 
fundamentalist theocracies, modern liberal democracies — we would find that virtually every 
                                                            
22 Not all sources of fear are the same, and only some disqualify the consent as freely given (e.g. when a subject 
would not consent but for the intimidation brought to bear on her by her regime). 
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system of political rule advances the claim that it (at least) provides for the basic security of 
those it addresses as its subjects. Though the regimes may fail to, or not even attempt to, actually 
provide for all subjects' basic security, the regimes nevertheless make this claim. Insofar as a 
regime claims to rule, it makes what I call the claim of minimally competent government 
(CMCG). All three of the paradigmatic cases of problematic consent rest on judgments that 
directly conflict with this claim.  
Therefore, in light of the three paradigmatic cases, I construct the following filter for 
determining quality consent. In order for consent to contribute to legitimacy, it must be based on 
governance assessments that meet the following two necessary conditions: 
I. The assessments do not explicitly contradict the claim of minimally competent 
government. That is, the governance assessments do not contain judgments that explicitly deny 
that each subject's basic security is to be provided for by the regime.  
II. The assessments are weakly reliable regarding whether the claim of minimally 
competent government is being met. That is, the governance assessments exhibit some weak 
counterfactual sensitivity to governance outcomes, namely those facts about whether the regime 
is providing for all subjects' basic security.  
 
These conditions suffice to exclude the dominator, the underling, and the culpably ignorant.  
To make clearer the implications of my view, examples of quality consent would include: 
the consenting libertarian who thinks he is better off than he would be otherwise but cares little 
for distributive justice, the consenting egalitarian who thinks the least well off are better off than 
they otherwise would be, and the consenting religious believer who thinks governance 
adequately enables the welfare conditions for spiritual development of his co-religionists but 
cares little for outsiders. These cases qualify because their consent is based on the right sort of 
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governance assessment, namely, the recognition of perceived benefits based on judgments that 
do not fall afoul of (I) and (II) above. A more ordinary case that also counts as quality consent is 
the simple-minded person who affirms something vague, such as, “Things around here are going 
well enough for the most part.”  
However, an example of non-quality consent is a consenting racial supremacist who 
believes his race ought to dominate others. He subjectively values rule that aims to compromise 
the basic security of some subjects. The principled reason for why his consent is disqualified is 
that the judgment on which it is based directly contradicts the government's claim to be 
minimally competent. Nevertheless, the sources of disqualification are more limited than in other 
theories; accordingly, being a libertarian or a religionist does not disqualify a citizen's consent. 
This admitted laxity in the ‘quality filter' is designed to allow even minimal awareness of 
governance success to qualify the consent as relevant for legitimacy. This latitude is appropriate 
in order to balance out the fact that non-consent bears (negatively) on legitimacy whether or not 
it is warranted by the governance facts.  
One implication of this approach is that legitimacy largely becomes a matter of what 
people believe about outcomes. Strictly speaking, there is no ‘welfare outcomes floor' built into 
the theory, and deliberately so. However, while it's true that failures of governance (failure to 
fulfill CMCG) do not directly reduce legitimacy, they tend to undermine it, because they make it 
much more difficult to achieve instances of quality consent among subjects. 
 
3.4. Achieving Actual Consent Among Subjects 
To summarize thus far: the sovereignty conception claims that regimes are legitimate 
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insofar as they achieve actual quality consent to rule among subjects.23 Actual quality consent 
captures the complex idea that individual consent to rule is non-instrumentally valuable, but that 
its value is nevertheless dependent. Its value is dependent because consent to rule, in order to 
contribute to legitimacy, must be based on positive governance assessments. When it is, it is 
quality consent, and a regime is legitimate to the degree that its subjects exhibit quality consent. 
Two further features of the view now come into view: the proportional basis of legitimacy, and 
the role of aiming at consent.  
On the sovereignty conception, legitimacy corresponds to the proportion of individuals 
who consent: the greater the proportion of free submission to ‘rule' under the authority, the more 
legitimate is the rule. This proportional approach makes sense if we imagine the case of a 
‘legitimacy utopia,' a voluntary association of individuals whose activities are just and welfare-
enhancing. In this imaginary association, to the degree that its activities require the exercise of 
power and authority, each individual affirms his voluntary subjection to the governing order. The 
unanimous consent in a legitimacy utopia reflects our intuition that, in a perfect world, citizens' 
acceptance of rule reliably tracks whether the rule is just and welfare-enhancing. As we 
gradually move away from the utopian case, we may imagine that fewer subjects exhibit quality 
consent. The sovereignty conception claims that the fewer instances there are of quality consent, 
the less legitimate is the rule.24  
In order to realize the ideal of voluntary rule, a regime must treat each subject's interest in 
voluntary rule as an interest worthy of being promoted and fulfilled for its own sake (rather than, 
for example, as a means to compliance). While the primary interest of a subject is in achieving 
                                                            
23 Though I do not have space to discuss it here, the view presupposes an independent account of subjecthood, lest a 
regime seek to achieve legitimacy by manipulating who counts as a subject. 
24 An upshot of this approach is that legitimacy assessments are scalar rather than binary. I argue elsewhere that a 
scalar concept has more theoretical advantages than costs. 
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quality consent, there are secondary interests in having the opportunity or possibility of 
exhibiting quality consent and in being treated as someone for whom consent-to-rule is non-
instrumentally valuable. Therefore a regime may aim at quality consent by advancing the 
secondary interests even if the primary interest is not achieved. When quality consent is aimed at 
and freely given, its achievement adds to the fulfillment of the ideal of voluntary rule. 
 
4. Advantages of the Sovereignty Conception 
In the remainder of the paper I compare the sovereignty conception to the other consent-
based views in order to show its advantages. With respect to contractualism, the chief advantage 
of the sovereignty view is that it better handles the problem of involuntary rule. Consider two 
examples in which the personal sovereignty conception is more sensitive to the problem of 
involuntary rule: a decent hierarchy and a dictatorship of enlightened guardians.  
Consider first a decent hierarchy. Imagine that a particular community contains a small 
linguistic/religious/cultural minority, wholly located on a political border shared with neighbors. 
This minority group is small and actively disliked by every political community in the region. By 
remaining a part of the original community, they believe (say, truly) that they are better off than 
in any alternative community, including if they were to secede. Although their basic security is 
provided for, they are not treated as full political equals -- say that they lack some substantive 
and some formal equal political rights. A contractualist account would typically deny legitimacy, 
as hypothetical agreement is premised on some presumption of recognition of political equality. 
This denial seems to tacitly assume that valid consent requires full equality. But, given that we 
do not require full equality for consent to be legitimating in other spheres such as commercial 
exchange and medical care (though we may impose other requirements), this assumption is 
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questionable. Many people are not treated equally in their political orders, but they nevertheless 
consent to their regime on other permissible grounds.  
The second example is rule by enlightened elites.25 Imagine a meritocracy in which those 
who rule are selected by past rulers on the basis of qualifications related to competence. Imagine 
they are permanently appointed and tend to enjoy a higher level of wellbeing because of their 
high social standing. Say that the society meets a very high standard of justice, which is that 
everyone is as well off as they could have possibly been, due to the rulers' wisdom and virtue. It 
seems that hypothetical consent ought to be imputed to everyone, since not only is everyone 
better off than some alternative scenarios, everyone is better off than all alternative scenarios.26 
However, say that the people do not believe that powers of office are assigned for the general 
good, because the inequality in welfare tracks relative power, and this welfare-determining status 
is assigned non-transparently. And so, say that 95% of the subjects do not consent to rule, and a 
significant proportion actively seeks revolution. It seems that, while there may be some welfare-
based or justice-based argument for the regime, the level of its legitimacy seems very low. This 
is because the rule is involuntary at the collective level and at the individual level. These two 
examples illustrate that the sovereignty conception fits our intuitions about voluntary rule better 
than the contractualist approach does.  
This discussion highlights that the sovereignty view advances a kind of asymmetry 
between consent and non-consent. Since this may seem counterintuitive, I want to address why 
this feature is appropriate. For the contractualist, in the same way that certain cases of consent 
(the unreasonable ones) do not bear on legitimacy, certain cases of non-consent (the 
                                                            
25 This stylized description arises from the example of the guardians in Plato's Republic, but it is also meant to 
encompass technocratic administration by civil servants in contemporary societies. 
26 One may object that welfare should be taken to include political equality and participatory rights, in which case 
everyone is not as well off as they could be.  However, one could include these in the welfare definition and still 
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unreasonable ones) do not bear on legitimacy. Contractualism thus subscribes to a kind of 
theoretical symmetry in the way consent and non-consent are ‘counted.' In contrast, the 
sovereignty conception defends what may be deemed an “asymmetric” view. Legitimacy is 
reduced whenever non-consent occurs, whether or not it is reasonable or well-grounded. 
Legitimacy is reduced because all kinds of non-consent set back the interest in voluntary rule. So 
the charge of asymmetry is a misnomer, because the sovereignty view construes consent as a 
dependent good, one whose value depends on certain conditions being met. Since its value is 
conditional, it is fitting that non-consent and non-quality consent both fail to advance voluntary 
rule.27 This feature also allows the sovereignty view to avoid fixing the facts about consent in a 
way that embeds partisan presumptions, one of contractualism's shortcomings.28 
 
4.1. Comparison to Voluntarism 
The sovereignty view also has advantages relative to voluntarism, but they emerge on 
different axes of comparison than the ones pertaining to contractualism. The two dimensions I 
will particularly discuss are the quality filter and the emphasis on individualism. 
The first advantage of the sovereignty conception over voluntarism pertains to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
generate the example, since even with more participatory government, it is still plausible that there be sufficient 
inequality of outcomes to foment rebellion. 
27 Claiming that non-consent and non-quality consent are similar in this respect does not imply that they are 
otherwise similar — indeed, they are very different in terms of their political consequences. 
28 Earlier I criticized contractualism for relying on idealized versions of consent, particularly ones that employed 
partisan assumptions about what are and are not relevant factors in political evaluation.  It may seem that the quality 
filter also involves an idealization of consent, insofar as the judgments underlying it must square with CMCG.  To 
this charge, I reply that there is one sense in which the sovereignty view clearly fares better than contractualism:  it 
accepts without idealization the significance of instances of non-consent to rule, admitting that individual instances 
of non-consent always undermine legitimacy.  Even if the individual's judgments are unjustified or grossly immoral, 
there is no tidying things up with ideal theory.  Regarding how to classify instances of consent:  the sovereignty 
conception's imposition of a quality filter does introduce some value judgments about consent's significance, but 
these are less problematic than contractualism in two ways. First, the amount of idealization is comparatively minor, 
because it is extremely accommodating of individuals' idiosyncratic views regarding the relevant factors in political 
evaluation. Second, the quality filter employed by the sovereignty conception does not draw on assumptions about a 
pre-political morality of justified coercion.  For this reason, it can be used to argue for the legitimacy of non-liberal 
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theoretical underpinnings of the quality filter. Earlier I noted that on the voluntarist view 
expounded by Simmons, there is a proviso on whether consent is valid, one that may seem 
similar in form to the quality filter: “We cannot bind ourselves by consent to immoral 
arrangements” {Simmons, 746}. Imposing this proviso is well motivated but inadequately 
defended. First, the standard of “immoral arrangements” is obscure and highly contested. Such a 
standard entails that in order to apply the proviso in determining the facts about consent (that, in 
turn, fix the facts about legitimacy), we must first settle the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a political arrangement to be moral.29 But it is often precisely when we face intractable moral 
disagreement that we most keenly need legitimacy standards. The second reason the proviso is 
not adequate to the purpose is structural: it presupposes and then relies upon an independent 
principle about the moral circumstances under which consent can authorize coercion. But the 
question under consideration is precisely how consent plays a role in legitimizing political rule, 
which in turn provides part of the justification for coercion.30 These are thorny questions that 
may not ever be perfectly resolved, but I will now show why the sovereignty conception 
addresses them more adequately.  
Whereas voluntarism says that the threshold for consent to be legitimating is when the 
political arrangements are moral, the sovereignty view has a lower bar. Essentially, the consent is 
legitimating when it does not conflict with the claim of minimally competent government. The 
imposition of a quality filter in terms of a claim to provide for basic security is narrower and 
clearer than the vague “immoral arrangements” criterion. Moreover, rather than drawing on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
states, demonstrating that it is less partisan than other consent theories. 
29 There also will likely be a problem with determining when political arrangements are moral independent of their 
legitimacy, but Simmons does not address this. 
30 The presupposition is problematic because it forecloses part of the question under consideration. Whatever 
principle Simmons (or Locke) is appealing to in order to justify applying such a proviso must have the following 
form: Coercion in the presence of consent (including that done by regimes who claim to be legitimate) is justified 
only when an arrangement is moral. But such a principle forecloses debate about the very question under 
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general principle of permissible coercion that claims to be objectively true, the sovereignty 
conception derives the quality filter from historical generalities about political orders. Its status 
as a valid quality filter arises from the trans-historical claim of minimally competent 
government, which is to provide for basic security. It takes as the minimum aim of all political 
orders to be providing for basic security, so it need not take a position about the ultimate aims of 
government, what counts as successful government, or even the necessary conditions for 
successful government. Therefore, in virtue of its source and its content, the quality filter on the 
sovereignty conception is less problematic that the voluntarist's proviso.  
The second major dimension on which the sovereignty conception is superior to 
voluntarism is the emphasis on individualism. Both views subscribe to an ideal of voluntary rule 
that gives prime significance to the actual facts about whether individuals consent. But the 
sovereignty conception has much more to say about achieving voluntary rule among all subjects, 
considered collectively. In order to support this claim, I must first clarify several related points of 
contrast between the views.  
The voluntarist approach employs an exclusively individualistic approach to assessing 
legitimacy, since legitimacy can be determined for each individual independent of other subjects' 
relationship to the regime. The sovereignty conception, instead, construes legitimacy as a feature 
of a regime with respect to its subjects collectively. To whatever degree a regime is legitimate, its 
legitimacy applies equally to all the subjects, whether or not each has consented in her individual 
case. Therefore, the sovereignty conception avoids the problems of assigning legitimacy 
assessments subject-by-subject. Accordingly, it is better placed than voluntarism to deny that 
unanimous consent is necessary for legitimacy. However, it nevertheless shares voluntarism's 
concern for the individual, as evidenced by tying legitimacy to actual instances of non-consent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
consideration, which is, what is the role played by consent in establishing legitimacy? 
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However, one may be reluctant to give up the exclusively individualistic approach when 
considering a scenario in which some individuals or groups are consistently treated much worse 
than others. For example, Thomas Shelby has argued that citizens who are differentially liable to 
be the victims of violent crime have correspondingly different political obligations (Shelby 
2007). But the differentially worse outcomes for some individuals ought not just affect the 
legitimacy of the regime for those individuals, while permitting the legitimacy of the regime for 
other individuals to be unaffected. Indeed, as this example suggests, the notion of political 
obligation is better suited to be the dimension on which individual differences may vary 
according to differentially worse treatment. By construing legitimacy at the collective rather than 
individual level, and by distinguishing legitimacy from political obligation, the sovereignty view 
is able to accommodate this important consideration. 
Ultimately, the sovereignty view handles the tension between the individual and 
collective in a way that is more subtle and illuminating than either contractualism or voluntarism. 
This is because it eschews unanimity without embracing exclusive individualism. Rather, it 
makes room in the account of legitimacy for the primacy of individual consent, while 
maintaining that such consent issues in legitimacy only in combination with other subjects' 
consent. It is a strength of the sovereignty conception that it neither collapses collective and 
individual instantiations of voluntary rule, nor does it hold that they are entirely independent. 
 
4.2. The Value of Legitimacy 
Recall that one aim at the outset was to identify a consent-based theory of legitimacy that 
showed why it was a concept distinct from other political concepts and at the same time 
something we should value. I will now discuss the sovereignty view in light of these desiderata.  
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Whether the sovereignty conception of legitimacy can illuminate what is uniquely 
valuable about legitimacy depends in part on what counts as quality consent. If the quality filter 
is too demanding, then the value of legitimacy can't be adequately distinguished from the values 
of liberalism, democracy, etc. On the other hand, if the quality filter is relatively undemanding, 
then it's hard to see why quality consent is worth achieving. When the quality filter rests on 
claims of objective morality, as it does for the voluntarist, then one may straightforwardly argue 
for the significance of legitimacy on that basis. But since the sovereignty conception does not 
avail itself of such a claim, the question becomes: how far can the view move away from relying 
on claims of objective morality and still assert that quality consent is something we should 
value?31 Fairly far, I hope to show, and to do so I will to return to the characterization of 
voluntary rule. 
The good that is instantiated by voluntary rule can be construed as a sort of congruence, 
or alignment, between the facts about organized power and the attitudes of those subject to that 
power. When voluntary rule is achieved, there is at least some partial alignment between what an 
individual values and what goods are promoted by the political order to which he is subject 
(though it may also promote other goods, ones valued by other subjects). In fact, the congruence 
involves three levels:  
(i) the regime claims to benefit its subjects through the exercise of power;  
(ii)  the regime benefits its subjects through the exercise of power; and 
(iii) an individual (or group) believes that the regime benefits subjects through the 
exercise of power.  
When these three statements can be made together, the situation represents a sort of unforced 
                                                            
31 This question applies in general to theorists in the political realism vein, who take political moralism to be the 
only alternative (Williams 2007). Elsewhere I argue that the view defended here avoids shortcomings of both 
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alignment or congruence between a regime's governance and the attitudes towards that 
governance among subjects.  
The instantiation of a voluntary ruling relationship at the level of a group of subjects 
represents, I propose, a kind of excellence exhibited by the regime in question. Therefore, 
voluntary rule has value at the impersonal level of subjects considered as a group, as well as at 
the personal level of each individual. If the good realized by voluntary rule can be characterized 
by a kind of unforced alignment or congruence, then the absence of voluntary rule may be 
characterized as a kind of alienation or dissonance. This alienation from one's own social or 
political order arises because one cannot authentically affirm the regime to which one is subject 
as in any sense worthwhile, i.e. as providing at least some benefits that one values subjectively. 
The absence of voluntary rule — involuntary subjection — also instantiates a kind of disvalue, 
for an individual and for a political community. 
How does the value of attaining voluntary rule compare to other political values? The 
sovereignty conception recognizes that our interest in voluntary rule is one interest among others 
at stake in being ruled. Accordingly, it allows that other things matter besides legitimacy for 
political justification. It does not commit to the lexical priority of legitimacy over other political 
values. The view does not entail that achieving voluntary rule is a necessary condition for all else 
to be valuable to an individual, or that it is a necessary condition for a regime to rule permissibly. 
Indeed, a loss on the dimension of legitimacy is sometimes desirable for the sake of other 
values.32  
Having shown how the sovereignty conception is oriented towards the valuable ideal of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
realism and moralism. 
32 The reader may wonder: what is the upshot of legitimacy?  In my view, legitimacy does not directly entail 
answers to questions about authority, obligation, right of revolution, etc., but it does bear on these questions.  The 
conception of legitimacy proposed here is meant to be compatible with a variety of accounts of authority and 
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voluntary rule, nevertheless there remain two kinds of subjects who may complain that their 
interest in voluntary rule is not given due consideration: the person who does not consent, and 
the person whose consent is non-quality consent. I will briefly sketch how a reply to these two 
kinds of subjects would proceed.  
First, consider the subject who does not consent. If the value of voluntary rule is in 
overcoming alienation in order to bring about congruence and identification between a subject 
and his regime, then why should a non-consenting subject feel that his interest in voluntary rule 
has been adequately respected? In other words, why is a regime legitimate even for the non-
consenters? Whereas other views claim that consent of the individual is appropriately valued 
only when it is actually obtained, the sovereignty conception claims that there is a way of 
valuing and showing concern for consent that doesn't require that it be obtained.  
According to this characterization, a regime may relate appropriately to a subject's 
interest in voluntary rule in two possible modes. One is for the regime to actually realize 
voluntary rule for that individual by providing benefits that result in a positive governance 
assessment. Failing this, the other mode is for the regime to respect, in a non-instrumental way, 
their interest in voluntary rule. While respecting the interest is second-best to realizing it, it is 
still important. Consider what the absence of this respect would involve: a regime's treating the 
interest in voluntary rule in the wrong way, i.e. Valuing consent only as a means, or not valuing 
consent at all. Valuing consent non-instrumentally, even when consent is not obtained, counts as 
a form of respect for the interest in voluntary rule. 
Another part of the reply is that a particular subject's interest in voluntary rule is 
respected when the rulers aim to achieve the consent of all the subjects. In my view, this position 
is analogous to consequentialism with respect to individual utility. When a decision is made on 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
political obligation, and especially to allow those to vary by subject. 
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behalf of a group with a consequentialist justification, then just because an individual's utility is 
not advanced by that particular decision does not mean that their utility does not count, or count 
the same as everyone else's. Likewise, just because an individual's consent is not achieved, that 
does not mean that his consent does not count, or count the same as everyone else's. This kind of 
argument is distinct from arguing that it is the possibility or the capacity for consent which 
matters.33 The capacity to consent is not its own end; rather, the capacity is to be understood in 
light of the value of achieving voluntary rule, for which it is an enabling condition. Therefore, 
aiming at consent in a non-instrumental way is necessarily involved in realizing the value of 
voluntary rule. Obviously much more needs to be said, but the response would proceed along 
these lines. 
Now consider the subject whose consent is non-quality.34 In claiming that involuntary 
subjecthood is bad, it is not yet clear why voluntary subjecthood is good only in combination 
with some judgments.35 Earlier I described “the dominator” and “the underling” as subjects 
whose judgments about rule explicitly deny that a regime ought to, at a minimum, aim at 
providing for the basic security of all subjects. On may ask, why exactly isn't their interest in 
voluntary rule being advanced? They presumably identify with the regime and feel at home 
within it, but they affirmatively deny that the government ought to be fulfilling CMCG.  
                                                            
33 It fundamentally differs, therefore, from Scanlon's treatise about the significance of choice. See (Scanlon 1988). 
34 One may be skeptical that anything short of quality consent is really consent to rule, in a sense worth caring 
about. Indeed, some theorists claim that consent to a dominating regime is not really consent to rule but consent to a 
system of mastery, thus violating the very ideal of voluntary rule. But this stance would render it logically 
impossible to consent to a dominating or unjust political order. A theory of legitimacy ought not deny that people 
consent to the exercise of power and authority under immoral conditions and for immoral reasons (whether 
consciously or not).  The sovereignty conception allows that people may consent to dominating regimes (e.g. South 
African apartheid), and this consent counts as genuine consent, though it may fail to be quality consent. When other 
theorists deny that this counts as consent, they are really denying that the consent has a certain sort of status (that it 
is legitimizing in some way).  But this comes to the same thing that a quality filter comes to, except that the 
sovereignty conception does not claim as a matter of logic that people can't consent to rule that is unworthy of 
consent. There is a difference between a regime that has consent and a regime that is worthy of consent. Neither of 
these can be conceptually reduced to the other, and they are both relevant to an individual's interests. 
35 The exclusion of some cases will require justification wherever there is a quality filter, but the explanation will 
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According to the sovereignty view, a subject's interest in voluntary rule is not advanced 
when the judgment on which his consent-to-rule is based conflicts with the claim of minimally 
competent government (CMCG).36 According to the above arguments about the enabling role of 
aiming at consent, voluntary rule at the group level can only be realized when a regime treats 
each subject's interest in voluntary rule as non-instrumentally valuable.37 If some subjects 
explicitly deny this, then they undermine the regime's aiming at group voluntary rule. The reason 
they undermine the regime's aim is because their consent is based on treating other subjects' 
consent as either not valuable or only instrumentally valuable. For example, the judgment on 
which the dominator's consent is based explicitly denies the non-instrumental value of voluntary 
rule for some subjects. It then becomes virtually impossible for the regime to aim at the 
dominator's consent while also aiming at other subjects' consent non-instrumentally. Therefore, 
those who consent to rule on grounds that conflict with the CMCG set back one of the enabling 
conditions for realizing the value of voluntary rule, and so they set back the interest in voluntary 
rule. Again, much more would need to be said, but the response would proceed along these lines. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that there are considerable shortcomings in the two dominant approaches to 
consent-based theories of legitimacy, contractualism and voluntarism. Although these consent-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
obviously vary according to the filter. 
36 Alternatively, one might claim that the interest in voluntary rule is advanced only by consent to political orders 
that actually achieve their minimal claim, that is, provide for basic security for everyone.  I do not take this route 
because it would require either stipulating that “achieving CMCG” is a constitutive ingredient in rule, or stipulating 
that it is a constitutive ingredient in the voluntarism involved in voluntary rule. The former is plainly false, and the 
latter has more theoretical costs than benefits, in my view. 
37 One potential problem with this response is that it seems to only require a concern for enough subjects consenting 
to rule, rather than a concern for all subjects consenting to rule.  But perhaps this is not such a bad problem, since 
the changeability of people's attitudes requires an ongoing practical concern for the consent of all (in losing the 
consent of some, you may need to win some others).  So a concern to achieve enough consent could translate in 
practice to a concern for the consent of all. 
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based theories affirm the ideal of voluntary rule, they lack appropriate sensitivity to factors that 
should matter for voluntary rule — namely, the actual levels of consent and non-consent among 
the subjects of a regime. In order to show that these shortcomings can be avoided, I have 
defended a different interpretation of the interest in voluntary rule as the basis of legitimacy. The 
sovereignty conception bases legitimacy on the proportion of actual consent among subjects in a 
regime, where each individual's consent is based on her own positive governance assessment. In 
articulating the sovereignty conception, I proposed a notion of quality consent to rule arising 
from the claim of minimally competent government. Finally, I argued that the notion of quality 
consent affords a theory of legitimacy that shows why legitimacy is valuable without relying on 
liberal democratic presumptions. Thus the sovereignty conception, as I have begun to defend it 
here, represents a promising alternative to other consent-based theories of political legitimacy. 
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